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“In existentialism, the individual's starting point is characterized by what has been called "the 
existential attitude", or a sense of disorientation and confusion in the face of an apparently 
meaningless or absurd world.”2     
   
Who are these people? 
Charlotte Eugenie Smith - Charlie at school – grown out of it but still used by relatives and close 
friends - hates Eugenie and never includes 'other/middle names' fields on forms. Marries Juan 
Spaniolo, but continues to use Charlotte Smith in her professional life and has bank accounts and 
investments in that name (without Eugenie or E) as well as new joint accounts as Mr & Mrs 
Spaniolo. On-line, uses Charles Smith to minimise objectionable email. 
 
Mary Hoa – an orphaned refugee from Vietnam in 1974, born (she was told) and registered on 
arrival as Duong Thi Hoa, DoB 21 June 1963. Her name is regularly recorded in incorrect order 
(would you know?) - has been known as 'Mary' since being fostered and now finds it convenient. 
Recently discovered evidence of her true birth date as 21 October 1962 and changed it with the 
Registrar, but many existing records still have her old 'presumed' DoB. 
 
Piotr Wrackmanski - registered by his father as Peter Rackman on arrival in Australia as a toddler.  
Ironically known to his workmates and family as 'Pole', which he is happy to use instead of Peter in 
many ordinary transactions – but when filling out official forms he is often uncertain whether to put 
Piotr W or Peter R.   Has had some mental health problems for which he has chosen to receive 
private psychiatric treatment using the name Peter Warne. 
 
Simon Townsend – born Michael Warwick, 24 May 1963, London, but relocated to Sydney in 1994 
as a protected witness and given a new 'official' identity of Simon Townsend, born 12 July 1964 in 
Manchester. Simon/Michael's wife and three children also have new identities as the Townsend 
family, although he is fearful that some of them may have remained in touch with some of their old 
friends and thinks that the children may want to re-assert their birth identity once they become 
independent. 'Michael' stands to inherit a substantial sum from his uncle and still owns a house in 
England registered in that name. 
                                               
1 Nigel Waters is Principal of Pacific Privacy Consulting, a Board member of the Australian Privacy Foundation and a 
member of the Executive of the Consumers Federation of Australia 
2 Robert C. Solomon, Existentialism (McGraw-Hill, 1974, pages 1-2)  (via Wikipedia) 
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The myth of a single identity 
Some people, and most organisations, unconsciously assume that each human being is tied to a 
single 'true' identity, and anything else, any other identity for that person, is a mistake, dishonest, or 
even illegal. This is understandable, but plain wrong. This false myth has serious adverse 
consequences that we should understand and fix.  
 
The reality is that thousands of people, like the four exemplars above,  have more than one 'label' by 
which they are known in different contexts – in effect different identities.   
 
To the extent that addresses are used as a component of evidence of identity (EOI – never POI!), 
often as a tie-breaker for the surprisingly large number of individuals with the same name and 
birthday, the permutations and complexities are multiplied – as many individuals have more than 
one legitimate address: - e.g. residential, postal, holiday homes, city apartments. 
 
Many government agencies and private sector organisations appear to think that everyone has a 
single 'official' identity, with all other 'labels' being aliases, 'known as...' or 'other names'.  Similarly, 
individuals are expected to have one 'primary' address, even if that is not the way they live. 
No legal basis? 
As far as I have been able to establish over many years, there is no legal basis for these 
assumptions.  Many laws require individuals, when giving their 'name' or address in a particular 
context to use a particular specifications, but these requirements are not all consistent.  In many 
circumstances, it is perfectly legitimate to use a name that you are 'commonly known by' provided 
there is no fraudulent intent, and to give any valid address. 
Underlying lack of trust 
This goes to the heart of the issue – many of those seeking to attribute a single official identity to us  
appear to be doing on the basis that the general public can't be trusted not to use different 'labels' to 
avoid obligations or carry out unlawful acts.  Clearly many people will use labels in this way - 
perhaps a growing number, although I have seen no hard evidence of that.  But does that justify 
treating everyone as though they have this intent?   
 
Surely the answer to that question depends on a number of factors: 
l The 'risk' to society of allowing individuals to use alternative labels, which in turn is a 
function of both frequency of abuse and the extent of any harm that can result.  Empirical 
evidence of the extent of identity crime is notoriously elusive and questionable. 
l The alternative means available to deter, detect and remedy any abuse – such as more 
resources for investigation and heavy penalties for use of alternate labels for evading 
obligations or other fraudulent intent.  What is the evidence that these more traditional 
approaches to compliance enforcement cannot be both effective and efficient? 
l The risks both to society and to individuals of enforcing a 'single official identity' policy – 
for instance in increasing both opportunities for and consequences of identity crime by third 
parties, or in making it harder for individuals to protect themselves – e.g. from abusive 
partners or unstable clients. 
l The residual risk of identity crime even after enforcement of strict 'single identity' policies, 
and the potentially greater impact of this in an environment where most users perceive the 
'official' system as more reliable.  Even in the most autocratic societies, there is a thriving 
market in false identities, and technology will never provide a complete answer. 
l The value we place on individual freedom and autonomy.  Provided I am prepared to 
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disclose any other relevant labels in specific contexts, what right has the State, let alone any 
private sector organisation, to determine how I present myself? 
Managing complexity 
We can all fully understand the desire of bureaucrats (both public and private) to try to 'order the 
world' for administrative convenience and least cost.  Any of us who have struggled to keep a 
simple mailing list up to date and accurate can sympathise!   
 
But surely the mantra of 'risk management' should be applied to identity management, instead of a 
futile pursuit of risk elimination, which is doomed to failure.  
 
And shouldn't we be clever enough to be able to manage complexity, rather than crudely trying to 
hammer 'rounded' individuals into square holes?   There are plenty of imaginative ideas around for 
doing so in relation to identity management – such as the many examples of federated or distributed 
identity systems, where identity is specified and managed in relation to a particular functional need, 
with links and associations made and stored only as and when required.  The resources listed at the 
end of this paper provide links to some of the discussion around these approaches 
 
Unfortunately, these solutions still generally languish in the academic and NGO communities, and 
the mainstream government and private sector identity management initiatives still appear to be 
determined to pursue simplistic 'single identity' approaches, despite all the evidence that this is a 
unachievable goal. 
Associated concerns 
Attempts at 'unique' labelling, often involving the assignment of an identifying code or number, 
cannot be divorced from their intended uses, and opposition to such schemes is as much to do with 
concerns about centralised databases, data sharing and matching and 'function creep' as it is 
objection to the ID scheme itself.   
 
In fact it is these other pressures that are creating the real problem – few of us have any difficulty 
with the use of 'purpose specific' identification numbers or codes such as TFNs or Medicare 
numbers – they are sensible ways of managing the complexity of names and other identifying 
particulars.  Nor is there any 'in-principle' objection to law enforcement agencies being able to link 
separate identities when justified for specific investigations – subject of course to appropriate 
controls and oversight.   
 
It is when governments try either to use existing identifiers in ways for which they were not 
designed, or to create new 'multi-function' identifiers, that they come up against both practical limits 
and philosophical and moral objections. 
 
In Australia, we have seen attempts to impose a national identification scheme defeated twice in the 
last 25 years – most recently with the demise of the last federal government's proposed 'Access 
Card'.  The dishonesty with which the scheme was 'sold' and the failure to admit its real nature 
probably contributed to its demise. But so too did a deep-seated objection by many Australians to 
being centrally and uniquely registered and labelled for the convenience of government, betraying a 
fundamental lack of trust. 
 
Proposals for much needed electronic health records (EHR) also continue to founder partly because 
of the refusal of their proponents to address legitimate concerns about centralisation of sensitive 
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data and the role of unique identifiers.  Federated or distributed models of identity management 
offer a way of breaking this deadlock, yet health bureaucrats continue to resist anything other than a 
overall 'big bang' solution.   
 
Technology suppliers lobby aggressively, but short-sightedly, in support of centralised databases 
and identifiers, despite the fact that there are probably greater commercial opportunities, long term, 
in federated or distributed systems.   
 
Overall, a failure of imagination and refusal to think past traditional 'managerialist' models leaves us 
stuck in a quagmire – unable to reap the many obvious benefits of information systems unless 
legitimate privacy and security concerns are addressed, but unwilling to apply our collective 
intelligence to managing complexity rather than pursuing a holy grail of simplicity and order. 
Identity Management in Australia 
Currently in Australia, there are many identity management initiatives under way, at both the 
Federal and State and Territory levels, and increasingly in joint inter-governmental projects, and/or 
partnerships involving the private sector.  They include: 
 
l A National Identity Security Strategy, comprising work on: 
· a Standard framework for Proof of Identity (POI) and Enrolment Processes 
· Security Standards on POI documents  
· a Document Verification Service  
· the Integrity of Identity Data, and  
· Authentication standards. 
l Electronic Verification for AML-CTF Act purposes. 
l ALRC proposals for more comprehensive consumer credit reporting 
l Various 'single sign-on' and authentication initiatives for access to government services. 
l Various employee ID initiatives including for airport and port security, and for the Australian 
Defence Forces. 
l Increasing cooperation between Registrars of Births, Deaths and Marriages. 
l Driver licensing authorities moving into identity verification roles. 
l Ever-increasing secondary uses of Electoral Rolls. 
 
Some of these initiatives are, belatedly, recognising privacy issues, with the growing use of Privacy 
Impact Assessment techniques, although depressingly few of the initiatives are as transparent as 
they need to be, with limited opportunities for public consultation and debate.  
 
What is still completely lacking is an overall national debate about the appropriate limits of identity 
management, and in particular the merits of functionally limited schemes and federated solutions as 
an alternative to universal unique identifiers and centralised databases.  The recent ALRC Report3 
touches on the issues – including in chapters on Definitions; Identity Theft; the Identifier principle 
and Credit Reporting –  but does not do them full justice.  
Leadership required 
Privacy Commissioners should be leading this debate, as they are starting to do in Canada and 
Europe.  This conference is a welcome initative by the Victorian Commissioner, and a good start, 
but is no substitute for a wider national discussion. 
                                               
3 ALRC Report 108, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, May 2008 
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Privacy and consumer advocates are willing, and indeed eager, to participate in this discussion (to 
the extent that their limited resources allow – engagement with civil society has a cost which needs 
to be included in the budget for these initiatives).   
 
Governments need to create the opportunities for a free, open and thorough discussion of identity 
management – otherwise they will repeat the mistakes of the past with millions of dollars wasted on 
over-ambitious IT projects that founder on the rocks of consumer suspicions and mistrust (amongst 
other hazards!).   
 
An integral part of the debate must be an acknowledgement there may often be no simple answer to 
the question 'Who am I?'. 
 
 
 
Resources 
On the Identity Trail – a joint project involving the Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario and various North American Universities and NGOs 
http://www.idtrail.org/ 
 
The Identity Project at the London School of Economics 
http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk/  
 
David Lyon and Colin Bennett (2008) Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, Security and 
Identification in Global Perspective,  and more generally The Surveillance Project at Queens 
University, Canada http://www.surveillanceproject.org/  
 
John Harrison and Pete Bramhall (2007) New approaches to identity management and privacy: A 
guide prepared for the Information Commissioner 
 
Roger Clarke (2004) Identification and Authentication Fundamentals and many other papers at 
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/AnnBibl.html  
 
Galexia Consulting (2003) Distributed Identity Case Studies and other relevant papers at 
http://www.galexia.com/  
 
... and for a fun but highly relevant presentation by Dick Hardt - Identity 2.0 
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Australian Privacy Foundation 
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